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SCHRIRO V. SUMMERLIN: A FATAL
ACCIDENT OF TIMING
INTRODUCTION
In Ring v. Arizona,' the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that the
State of Arizona relied on unconstitutional procedures to sentence
Warren Summerlin to death.2 In Schriro v. Summerlin, the Court up-
held Arizona's decision to proceed with his execution anyway.3
In Ring v. Arizona, the Court declared 168 death sentences uncon-
stitutional.4 In Schriro v. Summerlin, the Court authorized the imple-
mentation of most of those sentences. 5
In Ring v. Arizona, the Court observed that "the repeated spectacle
of a man's going to his death because a judge found that an aggravat-
ing factor existed" would undermine "our people's traditional... ven-
eration for the protection of the jury in criminal cases."'6 In Schriro v.
Summerlin, the Court sanctioned that spectacle. 7
In Ring v. Arizona, the Court held that capital defendants have a
Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine whether they are
eligible for capital punishment.8 In Schriro v. Summerlin, the Court
held that the doctrine of Teague v. Lane9 barred capital habeas corpus
petitioners with "final" sentences from exercising that right.10
Teague established a presumption against retroactivity in federal
habeas cases.1" Under this doctrine, criminal defendants may not re-
ceive the benefit of new procedural rules announced after they have
exhausted their direct appeals unless one of two exceptions applies.12
1. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
2. Id. at 609.
3. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2526-27 (2004).
4. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. See also Linda Petty, A Case Stranger Than Fiction (Sept. 3, 2003),
available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/09/03/summerlin.case.
5. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2526-27.
6. Ring, 536 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).
7. See Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2529 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
8. Ring, 536 U.S at 606 (invalidating ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (2000), which provided that a
sentence for first-degree murder may be enhanced from imprisonment to death if the sentencing
judge finds facts constituting aggravating circumstances that sufficiently outweigh any mitigating
circumstances).
9. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
10. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2526-27.
11. Id.
12. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
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The first Teague exception permits retroactive application of new rules
that decriminalize certain acts or exempt certain classes of individuals
from a particular type of punishment.' 3 The second Teague exception
allows the retroactive application of procedural rules that both "seri-
ously enhance the accuracy of the proceeding and alter our under-
standing of bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of
the proceeding.' 4
Teague therefore requires capital habeas petitioners to demonstrate
that the new rule they seek to have applied is either a substantive rule
or a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure. 15 In Summerlin, the
Court held that Ring was neither.16 Warren Summerlin's case high-
lights the inequities engendered by the Court's restrictive retroactivity
doctrine. 17 His is the story of a poorly represented capital defendant,
who at every stage of the appellate process asserted his Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury, yet was sentenced to death by a single, drug-
addled judge.' After Summerlin's conviction became final, the Su-
preme Court recognized the unconstitutionality of Summerlin's sen-
tence. 19 But because of Teague, he will never exercise his newly
announced rights.20
This Note concludes that Summerlin's result is incompatible with
the Eighth Amendment. Generally, the Constitution does not man-
date identical sentences for different defendants convicted of the same
crime.21 Death, however, is different. 22 A sentence of death cannot
be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner.23 The Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment requires that
13. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494 (1990).
14. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S.
227, 242 (1990)).
15. See id.
16. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2526-27.
17. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1122 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
18. Petty, supra note 4; see Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091 (noting that Summerlin's direct ap-
peal, state court post-conviction attempts, and federal habeas corpus petitions each included an
attack on the validity of Arizona's death penalty statute); State v. Summerlin, 675 P.2d 686
(Ariz. 1983) (rejecting on direct appeal Summerlin's claim that Arizona's death penalty statute
was unconstitutional).
19. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091-92.
20. See Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2526-27.
21. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
22. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 606 (2002); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411
(1986); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
289 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
23. See Jones (Louis) v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S.
967 (1994); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994); Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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"there [be a] meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it
is not."' 24 To execute Summerlin because his case came too early is
unconstitutionally arbitrary.
25
Part II of this Note traces the relatively brief history of retroactivity
as well as the current doctrine as enunciated in Teague v. Lane.2 6 Part
III breaks down the Supreme Court's decision in Summerlin.2 7 Part
IV analyzes the majority opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia and the
dissenting opinion of Justice Stephen G. Breyer.2 8 Part V considers
the impact of Summerlin and argues that a capital exception must be
made to the Teague doctrine.2
9
II. BACKGROUND: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, HABEAS CORPUS, AND
THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST RETROACTIVITY
The Supreme Court often will interpret the Constitution to require
new criminal procedures. 30 Questions of retroactivity concern the
availability of these new rules to defendants whose convictions are
already final. 31 This section summarizes the evolution of the Court's
nonretroactivity doctrine. It looks first at Blackstone's "declaratory
theory" and the presumption of retroactivity. It then examines the
impact of legal positivism upon Linkletter v. Walker,32 the Court's first
major rejection of presumptive retroactivity. Finally, this section dis-
cusses the second Justice John Marshall Harlan's influence on the
modern presumption against retroactivity.
24. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring)).
25. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003).
26. See infra notes 30-203 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 204-326 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 327-381 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 382-424 and accompanying text.
30. A "new rule" either: (1) "[B]reaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States
or the Federal Government;" or (2) "[Is] not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defen-
dant's conviction became final." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
31. A criminal defendant's conviction becomes "final" when his or her time for filing a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari has expired. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527 (1997). Of
course, unfavorable new rules may not be applied retroactively. See U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 10, cl.
1; Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997) (noting that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits laws that
(1) apply to events occurring before their enactment, and (2) disadvantage the person affected
by it).
32. 381 U.S. 618, 621 (1965).
132720051
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A. Declaratory Theory, Legal Positivism, and the Court's
Early Retroactivity Jurisprudence
Questions of retroactivity are relatively new to American jurispru-
dence.33 The English common law gave retroactive effect to all judi-
cial decisions. 34 Sir William Blackstone explained that judicial
decisions were inherently retroactive because courts did not create
new law.35 Rather, the courts functioned to "maintain and expound"
the old law. 36 Blackstone argued that judicial decisions are never
"new" pronouncements of law, even when they overrule prior prece-
dent.37 Instead, they communicate "a prior judicial failure to discover
the law."' 38 Thus, the English courts never had occasion to consider
the retroactivity of new laws. They merely corrected mistakes as to
"'what is, and therefore had been, the true law."' 39
This formulation, known as the "declaratory theory," permeated
the early jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. In Mar-
33. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that "the question of
whether a newly announced constitutional rule will apply retroactively on collateral review is a
relatively recent inquiry in American jurisprudence"); see Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S.
349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I know of no authority in this court to say that, in
general, state decisions shall make law only for the future. Judicial decisions have had retrospec-
tive operation for near a thousand years."); Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Appli-
cation in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962).
34. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1097.
35. Id.; see Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622-23 (stating that "the duty of the court was not to 'pro-
nounce a new law, but maintain and expound the old one"' (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE COMMEN-
TARIES 69 (15th ed. 1809))).
36. Id. Blackstone derived this argument from his belief that society ought to forge and re-
forge the laws of man to bring them in closer conformity to the natural law:
"This law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of
course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all coun-
tries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of
them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immedi-
ately, from this original."
Douglas H. Cook, William Blackstone: A Life and Legacy Set Apart for God's Work, 13 REGENT
U. L. REV. 169, 175 (2000) (citation omitted).
37. John Blume & Wdliam Pratt, Understanding Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 325, 326 (1991).
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Note, supra note 33, at 908 n.6 (1962) (emphasis added) (quoting Harry Shulman, Retroac-
tive Legislation, 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 355, 356 (1934)). As one com-
mentator explains:
From the declaratory nature of a judicial decision, Blackstone derived the necessity that
the decision have retrospective effect. If the decision interpreted a law, then it did no
more than declare what the law had always been. If subsequently it became necessary
to overrule this first interpretation, it was equally clear to Blackstone that the overrul-
ing decision also did no more than declare the law-albeit in a more enlightened
manner.
Note, supra note 33, at 907-08 (citing JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE
LAW 222 (1st ed. 1909)).
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bury v. Madison,40 as the Court first asserted its power of judicial re-
view, it assumed that the act of holding a statute unconstitutional
simply reiterated a preexisting status, voiding the law's application
both before and after its decision.41 In United States v. Schooner
Peggy,4 2 the Court applied a similar presumption to give retroactive
effect to a recently signed treaty.
43
The Court's use of declaratory theory continued into the early part
of the twentieth century.44 As time passed, however, some members
of the Court became concerned that the Blackstonian perspective im-
posed "hardship [upon those who had] trusted to its existence. 45 Out
of concern for the expectation interest of certain litigants, the Court
abandoned the declaratory theory and embraced legal positivism.
46
The legal positivists eschewed the declaratory theory and other de-
rivatives of natural law.47 Instead, they proposed a theoretical model
40. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
41. John Bernard Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied", 61
N.C. L. REV. 745, 746 (1983).
42. 5 U.S. 103 (1801).
43. Id. The Schooner Peggy Court agreed to hear an appeal from a condemnation proceeding
regarding a seized French ship. Id. at 103-04, 108. The lower courts held that the ship was to be
condemned. Id at 107. Before the Supreme Court could affirm, however, Congress ratified a
treaty with France that returned to the original owners any seized property not "definitively
condemned." Id. The Court held that the treaty controlled, asserting that
[if] subsequent to the [lower court's] judgment and before the decision of the appellate
court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs.., the court must
decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside judgment ... which
cannot be affirmed but in violation of law, the judgment must be set aside.
Id. at 110.
44. Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions, 26
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 811, 816-17 (2003); see, e.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,
442 (1886) (holding that the government's unconstitutional action "confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative
as though it had never been passed"); see also Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S.
538 (1941); Okla. Packing Co. v. Okla. Gas Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1940); Sioux County v. Nat'l Surety
Co., 276 U.S. 238 (1928); Moores v. Citizen's Nat'l Bank, 104 U.S. 625 (1881); Kibbe v. Ditto, 93
U.S. 674 (1876).
45. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623-25 (1965) (quoting Benjamin Nathan Cardozo,
Address to the N.Y. Bar Ass'n, 55 REP. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N 263, 296-97 (1932)).
46. Id. at 624.
47. LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 177-78 (1968). Professor H.L.A. Hart once de-
scribed legal positivism as the belief that
"[t]he existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be or be
not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a
different enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it,
or though it vary from the text, by which we regulate our approbation and disapproba-
tion. This truth, when formally announced as an abstract proposition, is so simple and
glaring that it seems idle to insist upon it. But simple and glaring as it is, when enunci-
ated in abstract expressions the enumeration of the instances in which it has been for-
gotten would fill a volume."
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under which legal rules are valid only because the government adopts
them, not because they are rooted in any divine law.48 This model,
advanced by Sir Jeremy Bentham and John Austin as a more realistic
approach to ascertaining the source of law, observed that "judges do
in fact do something more than discover law; they make it interstitially
by filling in with judicial interpretation the vague, indefinite, or ge-
neric statutory or common-law terms that alone are but the empty
crevices of the law." 49
In Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., the
Court adopted a positivist approach and held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require state courts to
retroactively apply their interpretations of state law.50 In Sunburst,
the trial court awarded the plaintiff damages against the defendant
based on a decision of the Supreme Court of Montana, which held
that certain entities that paid excessive intrastate shipment rates were
entitled to refunds.51 The Montana Supreme Court reversed its ear-
lier decision and held that refunds would no longer be available to
individuals who paid excessive rates.5 2 It also held, however, that its
decision would have only proscriptive application. 53
Arguing that the Montana Supreme Court had violated its due pro-
cess rights, the defendant appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.54 The
Court rejected the defendant's argument.55 It held that because "the
Federal Constitution has no voice upon the subject [of retroactiv-
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 596
(1958) (quoting JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 184-85 (Li-
brary of Ideas ed. 1954)).
48. FULLER, supra note 47. Professor Fuller explains:
[I]t will be helpful to offer some comparisons between legal positivism and its counter-
part in science. Scientific positivism condemns any inquiry projecting itself beyond ob-
servable phenomena; it abjures metaphysics, it renounces in advance any explanation in
terms of ultimate causes. Its program of research is to chart the regularities discernible
in the phenomena of nature at the point where they become open to human observa-
tion, without asking-as it were-how they got there. In the setting of limits to inquiry
there is an obvious parallel between scientific and legal positivism. The legal positivist
concentrates his attention on law at the point where it emerges from the institutional
processes that brought it into being. It is the finally made law itself that furnishes the
subject of his inquiries. How it was made and what directions of human effort went
into its creation are for him irrelevancies.
Id. at 177-78.
49. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623-24.
50. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 360 (1932).




55. Id. at 364.
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ity],"56 state courts may elect to avoid the hardships that arise when
parties rely upon overruled decisions to their detriment.
57
In Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, the Court
again refused to retroactively apply a judicial decision. 58 In that case,
the defendant defaulted on several bonds, and the plaintiffs sued for
damages.5 9 The defendant sought the benefit of decree of cancella-
tion, which had been issued after the plaintiffs' purchase. 60 The Court
refused, holding that the Blackstonian presumption of retroactivity
"must be taken with qualifications. '61 Citing the plaintiffs' expecta-
tion interest, the Court noted that any overruled decision "is an oper-
ative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. 62
Sunburst and Chicot County signaled a philosophical shift in the
Court's approach to questions of retroactivity. In Linkletter v.
Walker,63 this shift manifested itself in the criminal context for the first
time. 64 Linkletter marked the beginning of the modern presumption
against retroactivity in federal habeas cases.65 Prior to that decision,
the Court had retroactively applied all new rules to criminal defend-
ants.66 The Linkletter Court, however, broke from the natural law tra-
56. Sunburst, 287 U.S. at 364.
57. Id. The Sunburst Court held:
A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself
between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. . . . The
choice for any state may be determined by the juristic philosophy of the judges of her
courts, their conceptions of law, its origin and nature.
Id. Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, who authored the Sunburst opinion, seems to have had a
personal stake in retroactivity doctrine. See Note, supra note 33. One commentator notes:
It has been suggested that Cardozo's recurrent interest in developing methods to avoid
retroactive application of newly-announced rules stemmed from the injustice he felt
when Columbia Law School increased the length of its prescribed course to three years
after he had entered at a time when the required course was only two years. Cardozo
did not finish the three-year course and never received his degree.
Id. at 911 (citing Beryl Harold Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 10 n.31 (1960)).
58. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 372 (1940).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 374 (rejecting the Norton Court's belief that "the Act of Congress, having been
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree").
62. Id.
63. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
64. See id.
65. Paul J. Heald, Retroactivity, Capital Sentencing, and the Jurisdictional Contours of Habeas
Corpus, 42 ALA. L. REV. 1273, 1276 (1991) (citing Paul Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the




dition and declined to give retroactive effect to procedural rules.67 It
articulated a three-part inquiry under which certain new rules of crim-
inal procedure would not be applied to defendants whose trials had
concluded.68
B. The Linkletter Doctrine
In Linkletter, Victor Linkletter asked the Court to retroactively ap-
ply the newly expanded exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio.69 Linklet-
ter's argument was straightforward. His burglary conviction had
rested largely on evidence seized in a warrantless search of the defen-
dant's home.70 The Supreme Court of Louisiana had affirmed his con-
viction before the Mapp Court could extend the exclusionary rule to
state court proceedings.71
The Linkletter Court, however, held that Mapp would not be ap-
plied retroactively. 72 This marked the first time that a new pro-
nouncement on criminal law would not relate backward in time.73 In
its analysis, the Court attempted to reconcile two conflicting consider-
ations.74 First, it considered the equitable principle that similarly situ-
ated defendants should be treated similarly.75 Because the Mapp rule
applied to the defendant Dollree Mapp, it would only be fair to apply
it to other state court defendants arrested before Mapp. Second, the
Court considered the expectation interests of state law enforcement
agencies. 76 Unmitigated retroactive application of Mapp would defeat
many convictions obtained in good faith.77
To balance these competing interests, the Linkletter Court devised a
three-part test to govern questions of retroactivity both on direct ap-
peal and on habeas review.78 This test would balance the following
67. Id.
68. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636.
69. Id. at 619. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949), and holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied to the
states by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
70. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 621.
71. Id. at 629.
72. Id. at 638.
73. See Heald, supra note 65, at 1276.
74. Paul E. McGreal, A Tale of Two Courts: The Alaska Supreme Court, The United States
Supreme Court, and Retroactivity, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 305, 308-11 (1992).
75. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629. Justice Cardozo believed that any retroactivity doctrine should
be rooted in equity and not in the Constitution. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co.,
287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932).
76. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636. "The thousands of cases that were finally decided on Wolf





three factors: (1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) reliance upon the
old rule; and (3) whether retroactivity furthers the administration of
justice.79
The Court applied this test to hold that Mapp would not have retro-
active application. 80 First, the Court found that the primary purpose
of the exclusionary rule was to deter police conduct. It reasoned that
retroactive application of Mapp would not further that policy because
Mapp can only influence future police actions.81 Second, the Court
found that states had heavily relied upon Wolf v. Colorado,82 the deci-
sion overruled by Mapp.83 Finally, the Court found that retroactive
application of Mapp would not further the administration of justice
because it does little to enhance the accuracy of the criminal process.
84
It therefore held that Linkletter could not rely on Mapp to challenge
his conviction. 85
Some have suggested that the Warren Court established the Lin-
kletter doctrine to minimize the impact of its criminal procedure
revolution.8 6 As the Court issued an unprecedented number of new
procedural rules, many feared that the judiciary would be deluged
with challenges to otherwise final convictions. 87 Linkletter functioned
to protect the government's expectation interest in discarded constitu-
tional interpretations.88 Unfortunately, it often did so at the expense
of the individual's interest in fairness.
89
Nevertheless, the Linkletter doctrine persisted for nearly two de-
cades. In Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,90 the Court addressed
the retroactivity of Griffin v. California.91 Griffin had held that the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments barred prosecutors and trial judges
79. Id.
80. Id. at 638.
81. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.
82. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
83. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629; see text accompanying supra notes 72-77.
84. Id. at 638 (reasoning that Mapp "has no bearing on guilt").
85. Id.
86. See McGreal, supra note 74, at 309. To justify its decision to apply certain new rules
prospectively, the Court distanced itself from declaratory theory and embraced the Austinian
theory of legal positivism. Id. (citing Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623-24).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 303 (1989) (stating that "commentators 'have had a
veritable field day' with the Linkletter standard, with much of the discussion being 'more than
mildly negative"' (quoting Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a
Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1975))).
90. 382 U.S. 406 (1966). Tehan, like Linkletter, dealt with retroactivity in the context of the
writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 408 ("All avenues of direct review of the respondent's conviction
were thus fully foreclosed ... almost two years before our decision in Griffin v. California ... .
91. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
13332005]
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from commenting upon a defendant's exercise of his or her privilege
against self-incrimination. 92 The Tehan Court applied Linkletter to
hold that Griffin would not have retroactive application.93 First, the
Court found that the primary purpose of Griffin was to preserve the
integrity of the judiciary.94 Second, the Court found that "[t]here can
be no doubt of the States' reliance upon [pre-Griffin law] for more
than half a century. '95 Finally, the Court found that retroactive appli-
cation of Griffin would not further the administration of justice be-
cause it does little to enhance the accuracy of the criminal process.
96
It added that retroactive application of Griffin would invalidate as
many convictions as would have resulted if Mapp was retroactively
applied.97 The Court therefore held that Griffin would not have retro-
active application.
In Johnson v. New Jersey,98 the Court addressed the retroactivity of
Escobedo v. Illinois99 and Miranda v. Arizona.
10° Both Escobedo and
Miranda set down new standards governing the custodial interroga-
tion of criminal defendants. 101 The Johnson Court applied Linkletter
and held that neither decision would have retroactive application.
0 2
First, the Court found that Escobedo and Miranda functioned to pro-
tect criminal defendants from coercive interrogation.
10 3 It reasoned
that retroactive application of the two decisions would not further that
policy because the defendants had not presented any evidence of coer-
cion.104 Second, the Court found that states had heavily relied upon
92. Tehan, 382 U.S. at 407.
93. Id. at 419.
94. Id. at 414-15. "The basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against self-incrimination
do not relate to protecting the innocent from conviction, but rather to preserving 
the integrity of
a judicial system in which even the guilty are not to be convicted unless the prosecution shoul-
ders the entire load." Id. (citation omitted).
95. Id. at 417.
96. Id. at 414-15.
97. Tehan, 382 U.S. at 418 ("A retrospective application of Griffin v. California would create
stresses upon the administration of justice more concentrated but fully as great as would have
been created by a retrospective application of Mapp.").
98. 384 U.S. 719 (1966). As in Linkletter and Tehan, the Court addressed the retroactivity
question in the context of a post-conviction proceeding. Id. at 726.
99. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
100. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
101. Johnson, 384 U.S. at 732.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 729.
104. Id. at 730. The Court also noted that "[p]risoners are [already] entitled to present evi-
dence anew on this aspect of the voluntariness of their confessions if a full and 
fair hearing has
not already been afforded them." Id. (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)).
1334
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pre-Escobedo law.'0 5 Finally, the Court found that "retroactive appli-
cation of Escobedo and Miranda would seriously disrupt the adminis-
tration of our criminal laws. It would require the retrial or release of
numerous prisoners found guilty by trustworthy evidence in conform-
ity with previously announced constitutional standards.' 0 6 The Court
therefore concluded that neither Escobedo nor Miranda would have
retroactive application. 0
7
The Johnson Court, however, did not stop there. For the first time,
the Court did not limit its finding of nonretroactivity to the post-con-
viction context. 10 8 Instead, it extended its Linkletter analysis into the
context of direct review.10 9 The Johnson Court held that defendants
may not avail themselves of either Escobedo or Miranda when appeal-
ing their convictions."10 Rather, Escobedo and Miranda would only
apply to defendants whose trials had begun after the pronouncement
of each decision.' The Court affirmed this expansion of the Linklet-
ter doctrine one term later in the case of Stovall v. Denno." 2 The
resulting inconsistencies would eventually lead to Linkletter's
demise.' 1 3
105. Id. at 731 (stating that "[l]aw enforcement agencies fairly relied on these prior cases, now
no longer binding, in obtaining incriminating statements during the intervening years preceding
Escobedo and Miranda").
106. Johnson, 384 U.S. at 731.
107. Id. at 732.
108. Id. The Court reasoned that "[its] holdings in Linkletter and Tehan were necessarily lim-
ited to convictions which had become final by the time Mapp and Griffin were rendered." Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Johnson, 384 U.S. at 731. Of course, Danny Escobedo and Ernesto Miranda would re-
ceive the benefit of their namesake decisions. Otherwise, the Johnson decision would run afoul
of the "case or controversy" requirement of Article 11. For a detailed discussion of the Article
III ramifications of nonretroactivity, see Note, supra note 33.
112. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). In Stovall, the Court addressed the retroactivity of United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). Stovall, 388 U.S. at
294. It is interesting to note that Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall were all announced on the same day.
Wade, 388 U.S. at 218; Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 263; Stovall, 388 U.S. at 293. Both Wade and Gilbert
addressed the Sixth Amendment right to counsel with respect to line-up identifications. Stovall,
388 U.S. at 294. The Stovall Court applied Linkletter and held that neither decision would have
retroactive application. Id. at 296. First, the Court found that although Wade and Gilbert were
intended to prevent injustice, "[tihe unusual force of the countervailing considerations" favored
only forward operation. Id. at 299. Second, the Court found significant state reliance on prior
precedent because both Wade and Gilbert were relatively unanticipated new rules that had only
been announced a few minutes before Stovall. Id. Finally, since retroactive application of Wade
and Gilbert "would seriously disrupt the administration of our criminal laws," the Court denied
relief. Id. at 300 (quoting Johnson, 384 U.S. at 731).
113. See infra notes 116-185 and accompanying text.
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C. The Teague Doctrine
The Linkletter doctrine stood for more than two decades. In Teague
v. Lane, the Court overruled Linkletter in favor of a retroactivity anal-
ysis proposed by Justice Harlan. 114 The next section discusses Justice
Harlan's model and its influence on the current presumption against
retroactivity.115
1. Justice Harlan and the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The Teague doctrine was born out of Justice Harlan's disgust with
the Linkletter doctrine.116 Like other critics, Justice Harlan believed
that Linkletter's case-by-case approach had resulted in "incompatible
rules and inconsistent principles."'" 7 He proposed a new analytical
framework to address the problem of retroactivity. 118
114. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
115. For habeas courts reviewing an initial petition for habeas relief, Teague remains the con-
trolling retroactivity analysis despite the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1997). In Horn v. Banks,
the Court held that Teague was still the threshold analysis when considering questions of retroac-
tivity. Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002).
For habeas courts reviewing successive petitions for habeas relief, retroactivity analysis has
been modified. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2000). Successive habeas petitioners may take
advantage of a newly announced rule of criminal procedure only if the Supreme Court expressly
holds the rule to be retroactive. Id. That is, "[albsent an express pronouncement on retroactiv-
ity from the Supreme Court, the [new] rule is not retroactive." Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d
1082, 1096 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Thus, under AEDPA's provisions for succes-
sive habeas petitioners, it does not matter if the new rule is a bedrock, accuracy-enhancing rule
of criminal procedure. The rule does not apply retroactively until the Court says it does.
116. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 21 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that "[flor reasons explained in
my dissent in [Desist], I can no longer follow the 'retroactivity' doctrine announced in Stovall in
cases before us on direct review."); Von Cleef v. New Jersey, 395 U.S. 814, 817 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (stating that "all cases still subject to direct review by this Court should be governed
by any 'new' rule of constitutional law announced in our decisions"); Jenkins v. Delaware, 395
U.S. 213, 224 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that minimizing incongruity "can only be
done by turning our backs on the ad hoc approach that has so far characterized our decisions in
the retroactivity field").
117. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan based his retroactivity formulation on several
influential essays advocating restrictions on the scope of the writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g.,
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 690 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrele-
vant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970)); id. at 684, 690
(Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Paul Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963)); id. at 690 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Note,
Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1040 (1970)); id. at 686
(Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Daniel J. Meador, Habeas Corpus and the 'Retroactivity' Illusion,
50 VA. L. REV. 1115 (1964)); id. at 688 n.3 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Paul J. Mishkin, The
Supreme Court 1964 Term-Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of
Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965)).
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The first of Justice Harlan's dissents in this area came in Desist v.
United States. 1 9 In that case, the Court considered whether to apply
the newly announced rule of Katz v. United States
120 to a defendant on
direct appeal. 21 Katz interpreted the Fourth Amendment to define a
search as anything that violates a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy.122 The Desist appellants sought reversal of their drug traffick-
ing convictions, which were obtained on the basis of evidence ob-
tained via unwarranted electronic surveillance1
2 3  The Court
refused. 124 It applied Linkletter and held that Katz would not have
retroactive operation.
125
Justice Harlan dissented.126 He attacked the Linkletter doctrine for
its inconsistency: Some new rules applied to all cases not yet final;
some new rules applied only to cases that had yet to be tried; and
other new rules applied only to the parties in the case that announced
the rule.' 27 He further noted that
[w]e do not release a criminal from jail because we like to do so, or
because we think it wise to do so, but only because the government
has offended constitutional principles in the conduct of his case.
And when another similarly situated defendant comes before us, we
must grant the same relief or give a principled reason for acting
differently. We depart from this basic judicial tradition when we
simply pick and choose from among similarly situated defendants
those who alone will receive the benefit of a "new" rule of constitu-
tional law. 128
Justice Harlan recommended a new retroactivity test that would
eliminate the inconsistencies of Linkletter.129 His formulation distin-
guished between direct appeal and habeas review.
130 Defendants ap-
pealing their convictions would receive the benefit of new rules,
131 but
habeas petitioners collaterally attacking their convictions would not,
subject to two exceptions. 132
119. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
120. 389 U.S. 347 (1968).
121. Desist, 394 U.S. at 246.
122. Id.; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
123. Desist, 394 U.S. at 246.
124. Id. at 247-48.
125. Id. at 246. The Court reasoned that Katz merely extended the exclusionary rule-a rule
that had already been denied retroactive application in Linkletter.
126. Id. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 258-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
129. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 259 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). The first exception would retroactively apply all rules that
place conduct beyond the authority of the government to punish. Id. at 261 (Harlan, J., dissent-
20051
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Justice Harlan justified his distinction between direct appeal and
habeas review by contrasting the purposes each served. 133 On direct
appeal, appellate courts must decide upon all properly raised issues.134
Federal habeas review, however, serves two more limited functions:
(1) to minimize the risk of incarcerating the innocent; and (2) to deter
state courts from disregarding constitutional commands. 135 The first
function justified retroactive application of new rules that "signifi-
cantly improve the pre-existing fact-finding procedures."' 136 The sec-
ond function, however, justified only the application of "the
constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original pro-
ceedings took place." 137
In Mackey v. United States,138 Justice Harlan elaborated upon his
retroactivity formulation. 139 In that case, a plurality applied Linkletter
and held that Marchetti v. United States140 and Grosso v. United
States141 would not be retroactively applied to habeas petitioners. 42
Justice Harlan concurred only to the extent that, in his view, new rules
ing). The second exception would retroactively apply rules that "substantially affect the fact-
finding apparatus of the original trial." Id. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
133. Desist, 394 U.S. at 262-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 260 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 262-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Great Writ has performed its deterrence func-
tion since the Civil War. Ronald J. Bacigal, The Federalism Pendulum, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 771,
774 (1996). During Reconstruction, the Radical Republicans who controlled Congress did not
trust the former confederate states to uphold the individual rights of the newly freed slaves. Id.
Congress expanded habeas review and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment "as a powerful brake
on runaway state government." Id. This gradual expansion culminated in Brown v. Allen, which
held that a state court's failure to adequately protect a constitutional right would not be res
judicata on habeas review. 344 U.S. 443, 511 (1953). In the post-Warren Court era, however,
both Congress and the Court have invoked principles of federalism and comity to restrict the
scope of the Great Writ. See generally Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (restricting the
availability of Fourth Amendment claims on habeas review because the state courts are just as
capable of defending the Constitution as the federal courts).
136. Desist, 394 U.S. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 263 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Professor Mishkin, however, argues that "it is rare that
new rules of constitutional law, even retroactively applied, will conflict with reliance of a sort
that merits protection." Mishkin, supra note 118, at 71.
138. 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
139. Id. at 675 (Harlan, J., concurring).
140. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
141. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
142. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 673. Marchetti and Grosso each provided a defense to the federal
gambling tax statutes based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
The plurality determined that the rule functioned merely to eliminate any appearance of impro-
priety. Id. (citing Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966)). Balancing this
purpose against the government's reliance on prior precedent and the frustration of certain state
interests, the plurality held that Linkletter barred retroactive application of Marchetti and
Grosso. Id. at 674.
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should not be applied retroactively on habeas review. 143 His concur-
rence supplied the crucial fifth vote to deny relief.
144
Justice Harlan used Mackey to expound upon his analysis in De-
sist.145 He again emphasized the distinction between direct appeal
and habeas review. 46 He argued that important state interests attach
once a defendant has exhausted his or her direct appeals, including:
(1) the "interest in insuring that there will at some point be the cer-
tainty that comes with an end to litigation"; (2) the interest in ensuring
that "attention will ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction
was free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be re-
stored to a useful place in the community"; and (3) the interest in
conserving judicial resources.' 47 Justice Harlan concluded that these
goals could not be served by retroactively applying new rules to cases
on habeas review. 148
Justice Harlan's Mackey concurrence again identified the two ex-
ceptions to his retroactivity formulation. 149 As in Desist, the first ex-
ception would allow habeas courts to retroactively apply new rules of
substantive due process.150 Unlike Desist, however, the second excep-
tion no longer encompassed new procedural rules that improved the
143. Id. at 700 (Harlan, J., concurring).
144. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
145. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 673. Justice Harlan also took another swipe at the Linklettter doc-
trine, declaring that it had absolved the Court of responsibility for its constitutional pronounce-
ments by permitting the Court to minimize the impact of its decisions upon cases not yet final.
Id. at 681 (Harlan, J., concurring). He argued that the Court should consider the consequences
of a new constitutional rule before it announces the rule, not after. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan also noted that Linkletter encroached upon the legislative function:
In truth, the Court's assertion of power to disregard current law in adjudicating cases
before us that have not already run the full course of appellate review is quite simply an
assertion that our constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in effect of
legislation. We apply and definitively interpret the Constitution, under this view of our
role, not because we are bound to, but only because we occasionally deem it appropri-
ate, useful, or wise. That sort of choice may permissibly be made by a legislature or a
council of revision, but not by a court of law.
Id. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring). The superior approach to retroactivity, Justice Harlan con-
cluded, would focus not on the purpose of the new rule, but rather on the nature of the proceed-
ing in which retroactivity is sought. Id. at 682 (Harlan, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 682-83 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that "this Court's function in reviewing a
decision allowing or disallowing a writ of habeas corpus is, and always has been, significantly
different from our role in reviewing on direct appeal the validity of nonfinal criminal
convictions").
147. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2529-30 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 690-91 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
148. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 683 (Harlan, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring).
150. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). These are rules that place conduct beyond the authority of
the government to punish. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). "[T]he obvious interest in freeing indi-
viduals from punishment for conduct that is constitutionally protected seems to me sufficiently
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fact-finding process.' 5 ' Instead, Justice Harlan narrowed the second
exception to include only new procedural rules that are central to the
fundamental fairness of the trial.' 52
Justice Harlan retired from the Court shortly after concurring in
Mackey.153 His views on Linkletter, however, were not forgotten. The
Court eventually adopted his retroactivity formulation in Griffith v.
Kentucky' 54 and Teague v. Lane.155 In Griffith, the Court held that
new rules would be retroactively applied to all cases not yet final. 56
In Teague, the Court held that new procedural rules would not gener-
ally be available to habeas petitioners. 157
2. Teague v. Lane
Both Griffith and Teague addressed the retroactivity of Batson v.
Kentucky, which reduced the evidentiary showing required to raise an
equal protection challenge to the peremptory challenge system.158
Griffith retroactively applied Batson to cases on direct appeal. 159
Teague barred retroactive application of Batson to cases on habeas
review.160
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the opinion in Teague on
behalf of a plurality of four Justices.' 6 ' Her analysis-which came as
something of a surprise to the litigants as neither party had briefed
nor argued the issue of retroactivity-began by casting retroactivity as
a threshold issue. 162 The plurality held that federal habeas courts
substantial to justify applying current notions of substantive due process to petitions for habeas
corpus." Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
151. See id. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring).
152. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693-94 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright,'372
U.S. 335, 349 (1963), as an example of such a rule).
153. BoB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 158 (1979).
154. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
155. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
156. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322 (holding that the "failure to apply a newly declared constitu-
tional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adju-
dication"). Griffith concerned the retroactive application of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), to cases on direct review. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322. Batson reduced the burden on de-
fendants who attack the prosecution's use of discriminatory peremptory challenges. Id.
157. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
158. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98.
159. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328.
160. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
161. Id. at 288.




could no longer recognize a new procedural rule without first estab-
lishing that such a rule would be retroactive. t 63
The Teague plurality continued its analysis by defining a "new rule"
as one that "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the
States or the Federal Government.' 64 Under this broad definition,
"a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by prece-
dent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.' 65
The plurality then directed habeas courts to deny relief to petition-
ers relying on new rules unless one of two narrow exceptions ap-
plies. 166 First, habeas petitioners could benefit from new substantive
rules-rules that decriminalize a class of conduct or remove a specific
type of punishment for a class of defendants. 67 Lawrence v. Texas' 68
and Atkins v. Virginia169 serve as examples of such a rule. In Law-
rence, the Court announced a new rule that decriminalized private,
consensual sodomy. 170 In Atkins, the Court announced a new rule
that barred the execution of mentally retarded defendants. 171 Each of
these new rules is available on habeas review under the first Teague
exception. 172
Second, habeas petitioners could rely on "'watershed rules of crimi-
nal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of
the criminal proceeding."1 73 With this second exception, the Teague
plurality fused Justice Harlan's Desist formulation with his Mackey
formulation. 174 Accordingly, a procedural rule must meet two qualifi-
cations to warrant retroactive application: (1) it must "alter our under-
standing of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to
163. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300. But see id. at 334-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (providing a com-
prehensive list of procedural rules first recognized on habeas review).
164. Id. at 301.
165. Id.; see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIcriON 812 (1994).
166. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
167. See id. at 307.
168. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
169. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
170. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
171. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)).
172. Marc R. Shapiro, Re-Evaluating the Role of the Jury in Capital Cases After Ring v. Ari-
zona, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 633, 648 n.103 (2004) (discussing Atkins under the Teague
exception).
173. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311
(1989)).
174. Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to Teague
v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM J. CRIM. L. 203,
288 (1998); see Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693-94 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction;"' 175 and (2) it must enun-
ciate "new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished." 176 The Teague plurality indicated
that this class of rules is extremely narrow, and it is unlikely that any
has yet to emerge. 77
Thus, the Teague plurality replaced the Linkletter doctrine with a
four-part retroactivity analysis. 178 First, the habeas court must deter-
mine "the date on which the defendant's conviction became final."'1 79
Second, the habeas court must determine whether the petitioner seeks
the benefit of a new rule.' 80 If the rule is not new, then Teague is
inapplicable.' 81 Third, the habeas court must determine whether the
new rule is procedural or substantive. 182 If the rule is substantive,
then Teague is inapplicable. 18 3 Fourth, the habeas court must deter-
mine whether the new rule falls within one of the Teague excep-
tions.' 84 Applying this formulation, the Teague plurality concluded
that Batson could not be applied retroactively on habeas review.' 85
3. The Teague Doctrine and Capital Punishment
In Teague, the Court adopted Justice Harlan's approach to retroac-
tivity. In Penry v. Lynaugh,186 the Court extended Teague into the
capital punishment context. To appreciate the significance of this ex-
tension, it is important to understand capital sentencing.
Modern death penalty jurisprudence begins with Furman v. Geor-
gia.187 In a five to four decision, the Furman Court invalidated forty
175. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311; see Tanya G. Newman, Note, Summerlin v. Stewart and Ring
Retroactivity, 79 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 755, 788-89 (2004) (describing Teague and concluding that
Ring fit within Teague's second exception).
176. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313.
177. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 243 (1990) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313).
178. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1099 (9th Cir. 2003).
179. See O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156-57 (1997).
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1998).
183. Id. In Schriro v. Summerlin, the majority acknowledged that the Bousley substantive/
procedural distinction is sometimes collapsed into the first Teague exception. Schriro v. Sum-
merlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2522 (2004). Substantive rules, however, "are more accurately character-
ized as substantive rules not subject to" the Teague presumption against retroactivity. Id. at 2522
n.4. It is unclear whether Bousley warrants a step of its own or whether it is merely implicit in
applying Teague's exceptions. It may even be a logical first step in the Teague analysis.
184. See O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 156-57.
185. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
186. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
187. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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state death penalty statutes on Eighth Amendment grounds.18 8 Be-
cause nine Justices delivered nine different opinions on the subject,
the impact of Furman was not fully understood until Gregg v. Geor-
gia.'89 In Gregg, a plurality held that while the death penalty is not
unconstitutional per se, 190 it could not be administered in "an arbi-
trary and capricious manner."' 9'
The Gregg plurality proposed a series of procedural safeguards to
protect against arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.' 92 The first
was the bifurcation of the capital trial into a guilt phase and a penalty
phase. 193 Only after the jury has found the defendant guilty of capital
murder does it make an "individualized determination" of whether
the death penalty is appropriate.1 94 The second procedural safeguard
involved automatic appellate review of convictions and sentences.
95
The final procedural safeguard was proportionality review by appel-
late courts to ensure that "there is [a] meaningful basis for distinguish-
ing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not."'1 96
Since Gregg, the Court has repeatedly held that the death penalty
"is different in both its severity and finality."'197 It has held that
"[b]ecause of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding dif-
ference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is
the appropriate punishment in a specific case." 198 When it comes to
retroactivity, however, the Court does not hesitate to apply Justice
Harlan's pre-Furman analysis to post-Furman capital cases. 199
188. Id. (per curiam); see NINA RIVKIND & STEVEN F. SHATZ, THE DEATH PENALTY 74
(2001).
189. 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see RIVKIND & SHATZ, supra note 188, at 74.
190. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188.
191. Id. (stating that "Furman held that [the death penalty] could not be imposed under sen-
tencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner"). In the words of Justice Potter Stewart, "[pre-Furman ] death sentences are
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." Furman,
408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
192. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-95. After Gregg, many states adopted these procedures as their
own. See Death Penalty Information Center, History of the Death Penalty, Part II: Limiting the
Death Penalty, at www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglarticle.php?scid=15&did=411#limitationswithinthe
UnitedStates (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
193. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190-92 (holding that a bifurcated system is more likely to ensure
elimination of the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman).
194. Id. at 190-91; see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978).
195. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
196. Id. at 188 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
197. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977).
198. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
199. Justice Harlan delivered the Court's final major pre-Furman decision. See McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 185 (1971) (rejecting the argument that the absence of standards to
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In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court held that Teague also applied in
capital cases.200 Once again reaching its conclusion without the bene-
fit of briefing or argument, the Court reasoned that "[tihe finality con-
cerns underlying Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity are
applicable in the capital sentencing context, as are the two exceptions
to his general rule of nonretroactivity. '' 201 In dissent, Justice William
J. Brennan, Jr. prophesized,
This extension means that a person may be killed although he or she
has a sound constitutional claim that would have barred his or her
execution had this Court only announced the constitutional rule
before his or her conviction and sentence became final. It is intoler-
able that the difference between life and death should turn on such
a fortuity of timing and beyond my comprehension that a majority
of this Court will so blithely allow a State to take a human life
though the method by which the sentence was determined violates
our Constititution.202
Since Penry, however, the Court has consistently rejected the argu-
ment that Teague should not apply in capital cases.20 3
III. SUBJECT OPINION: SCHRIRO V. SUMMERLIN
In Schriro v. Summerlin, the Supreme Court faced the question of
whether to retroactively apply Ring to capital defendants who had ex-
hausted their appeals prior to Ring.20 4 The Summerlin Court an-
guide the jury's discretion on the punishment issue violates the Due Process.Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment).
200. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989).
201. Id. Justice Brennan was not pleased with this development:
[The majority says] merely that not to apply Teague would result in delay in killing the
prisoner and in a lack of finality. There is not the least hint that the Court has even
considered whether different rules might be called for in capital cases, let alone any
sign of reasoning justifying the extension. Such peremptory treatment of the issue is
facilitated, of course, by the Court's decision to reach the Teague question without al-
lowing counsel to set out the opposing arguments.
Id. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nor did Justice Stevens ap-
prove. Id. at 349 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens stated:
"I do not support the Court's assertion, without benefit of argument or briefing on the issue, that
Teague's retroactivity principles pertain to capital cases." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
202. Id. at 341 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203. See, e.g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 486 (1990) (barring capital habeas petitioners from
relying on new rules to challenge the constitutionality of certain jury instructions). Teague's
"limitation on the proper exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction applies to capital and noncapital
cases." Id.; see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 243 (1990) (barring capital habeas petitioners
from relying on new rules to challenge the constitutionality of certain prosecutorial statements).
"[P]etitioner has not suggested any Eighth Amendment rule that would not be sufficiently 'fun-
damental' to qualify for the proposed definition of the exception .... In practical effect, peti-
tioner asks us to overrule [Penry]. This we decline to do." Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 243.
204. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2521 (2004).
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swered this question in the negative.20 5 First, it held that Ring
announced a rule of procedure as opposed to one of substance.
20 6
Second, the Court held that Ring did not fit Teague's exception for
"watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.
2 0 7
This section first discusses the bizarre factual context from which
Summerlin arose. It then examines the Ninth Circuit's decision to ap-
ply Ring retroactively and the Supreme Court's reversal of that
decision.
A. Factual Background
In 1982, an Arizona jury convicted Warren Wesley Summerlin of
first-degree murder. 208 Summerlin was subsequently sentenced to
death under then-existing Arizona procedure, which required a judge
to determine the suitability of a death sentence rather than a jury.209
His case is noteworthy not merely for the legal questions it poses, but
also for the peculiar circumstances underlying the Supreme Court's
decision. 210 Each stage of Summerlin's bizarre proceedings-investi-
gation, trial, and sentencing-was infused with the stuff of "legal
fiction. '211
In April of 1981, the Tempe Police Department conducted a brief
but odd investigation into the disappearance of Brenna Bailey, an in-
vestigator for Finance America.212 Bailey had been reported missing
after visiting Summerlin's home to discuss his delinquent account.
213
Summerlin became the key suspect after an anonymous tip indicated
that he may have murdered Bailey. 214 Summerlin's mother-in-law
later identified herself as the caller and testified that her information
was the result of her daughter's clairvoyance. 21 5
205. Id. at 2526.
206. Id. at 2523.
207. Id. (citation omitted).
208. Surnmerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2003). Summerlin was also convicted
of sexual assault. Id.
209. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 582, 609 (2002); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(c)
(West 2001).
210. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1084. In fact, Summerlin's trial and sentencing proceedings
prompted the majority to quote Mark Twain, who observed: "truth is often stranger than fiction
because fiction has to make sense." Id.
211. Id. "It is the raw material from which legal fiction is forged: A vicious murder, an anony-
mous psychic tip, a romantic encounter that jeopardized a plea agreement, an allegedly incompe-
tent defense, and a death sentence imposed by a purportedly drug-addled judge." Id.
212. Id. at 1084-85.
213. Id.
214. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1084-85.
215. Id. at 1085.
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The police recovered Bailey's body shortly thereafter. 216 After ob-
taining a warrant to search Summerlin's residence, the police discov-
ered several pieces of evidence incriminating Summerlin.2 17
Summerlin, described by the Ninth Circuit as "functionally re-
tarded,"2 18 made several incriminating statements to the police.219
The state of Arizona charged Warren Summerlin with Bailey's mur-
der.2 20 It then appointed the public defender's office to represent
Summerlin. 2 1 Over the next year, Summerlin was represented by
three different defense attorneys. 222 His first attorney, a public de-
fender, ordered a competency hearing for Summerlin and promptly
resigned from the office. 223 His second attorney-also from the pub-
lic defender's office-took over the case and continued the inquiry
into the mental health of her client. 224 She also engaged in a series of
successful negotiations with her prosecutorial counterpart and
brokered a generous plea agreement on behalf of her client.2 25 Unfor-
tunately for Summerlin, his plea agreement was put in jeopardy when
his lawyer engaged in a romantic encounter with the prosecutor.226
Privately citing the obvious ethical complications, she eventually left
the case.227 The court then appointed a third attorney to represent
Summerlin, an attorney who consulted with his client very little and
investigated even less.22 8 A jury convicted Summerlin of first-degree
murder and sexual assault.229
Summerlin then proceeded to the sentencing phase of his trial. 230
Under then-existing Arizona law, the sentencing judge was the sole
arbiter of the decision to impose death.2 31 Arizona law inflicted capi-
tal punishment if the sentencing judge found facts constituting aggra-
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1084. Summerlin dropped out of the seventh grade due to dyslexia and is currently
diagnosed with organic brain dysfunction. Id. at 1086.
219. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1086.
220. Id. at 1085.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 1085-88.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1086.
226. Id. at 1086-87.
227. Id. at 1088.
228. Id. at 1088-89. Today, this failure to investigate would likely constitute a deprivation of
Warren Summerlin's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. See generally
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
229. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1088.
230. Id.
231. State v. Summerlin, 675 P.2d 686, 695 (Ariz. 1983) (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-703
(1977)).
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vating circumstances that sufficiently outweighed any mitigating
circumstances that called for leniency.2 32 At the hearing, despite am-
ple evidence demonstrating Summerlin's mental and psychological de-
ficiencies, his third attorney introduced no mitigating factors.
233
At the close of the proceedings, the sentencing judge, Judge Philip
Marquardt, declared that he would announce his decision after a
weekend of deliberation.2 34 Unfortunately for Summerlin, his judge
would later be disbarred after several convictions for marijuana use. 235
It is unknown how Judge Marquardt spent that weekend or whether
he deliberated in a chemically altered state.236 The record, however,
does indicate that when Judge Marquardt returned to his courtroom
that Monday, he appeared to have confused the facts and circum-
stances of Summerlin's case with those of another case over which he
was presiding.237 Undeterred, Judge Marquardt found two aggravat-
ing factors and "no sufficiently substantial mitigating factors. ' 238 He
sentenced Summerlin to death.2 39
B. Procedural History
The Arizona Supreme Court heard Summerlin's automatic direct
appeal in 1983.240 It rejected each of Summerlin's arguments for re-
versal, including his claim that Arizona's death penalty statute241 was
unconstitutional because it required a trial judge rather than a jury to
232. Id. at 695-96 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (1977)).
233. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1088-89.
234. Id. at 1090.
235. Id. at 1089 n.1. In 1988, a Texas court convicted Marquardt of misdemeanor possession
of marijuana. Id. He was also cited in a 1991 Phoenix Police Department report detailing his
attempts to buy marijuana. See id.; Matter of Disbarment of Marquardt, 503 U.S. 902 (1992); see
also Petty, supra note 4 (stating that "the trial judge exhibited confusion about the evidence
during pretrial hearings and at trial, and that during the trial he made 'quite perplexing, if not
unintelligible, statements").
236. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1090.
237. Id. The extent of Judge Marquardt's confusion is unknown, since the district court did
not order discovery on this issue. Id. at 1090. As the Ninth Circuit noted, the mere fact that
Judge Marquardt imposed two sentences of death is troubling. Id. at 1114 (stating that "[a]
reasonable inference from the habituation brought about by imposing capital punishment under
near rote conditions is that a judge may be less likely to reflect the current conscience of the
community and more likely to consider imposing a death penalty as just another criminal
sentence").
238. Id. at 1090.
239. Id.
240. State v. Summerlin, 675 P.2d 686 (Ariz. 1983); see ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 26.15 & 31.2(b)
(2005).
241. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (2005) (providing that a sentence for first degree murder
may be enhanced from imprisonment to death if the sentencing judge finds at least one of sev-
eral specific aggravating factors and "no sufficiently substantial mitigating" circumstances that
call for leniency).
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determine the elements necessary for a capital sentence.2 42 The Ari-
zona Supreme Court instead relied on the then-existing Supreme
Court precedent of Proffit v. Florida243 and held that the Sixth
Amendment does not require jury sentencing in capital cases.2 44
After his conviction became final,2 45 Summerlin filed his initial peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus in federal court and made four attempts
to receive post-conviction relief in Arizona state court.246 Each time,
Summerlin attacked the validity of Arizona's capital punishment stat-
ute under the Sixth Amendment, and each time, Summerlin's claim
was denied. 247
Meanwhile, in 1990, the Supreme Court heard an identical attack
on Arizona's death penalty. In Walton v. Arizona, 48 the Supreme
Court rejected Jeffrey Walton's claim that Arizona's capital sentenc-
ing scheme was incompatible with the Sixth Amendment right to a
trial by jury.24 9 Walton argued that aggravating circumstances consti-
tuted elements of the offense requiring adjudication by a jury.250 The
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Arizona's aggravating circum-
stances were merely sentencing considerations that a judge could con-
242. Summerlin, 675 P.2d at 695 (stating that "we have expressly followed the mandate of
Proffit in rejecting similar arguments that there is a right under the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution to have a jury participate in the capital sentencing decision"). Sum-
merlin's direct appeal also argued the following: (1) The trial court erroneously denied his mo-
tion to suppress; (2) the trial court improperly commented on the evidence in front of the jury;
(3) the trial court erroneously admitted eight gruesome autopsy photographs into evidence; (4)
certain of the prosecution's evidence violated his anti-marital fact privilege; (5) the Arizona
death penalty statute was also unconstitutional because it provided no guidance for weighing
aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (6) his death sentence was inappropriate; and (7) his
death sentence was disproportionate when compared to other similar cases. Id. at 689.
243. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
244. Summerlin, 675 P.2d at 695 (quoting Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976)). The
Supreme Court
has never suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required. And it would ap-
pear that judicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even greater consistency in the
imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment, since a trial judge is more
experienced in sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to impose sentences
similar to those imposed in analogous cases.
Id.
245. See Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that Summerlin's
appeal became final when the Arizona Supreme Court denied him a rehearing and when his
time to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court expired).
246. Id. at 1091.
247. Id.
248. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
249. Id. at 649.
250. Id. at 647; see Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117-18 (1974) (indicating that each
element of an offense must be: (1) charged in the indictment; (2) submitted to a jury; and (3)
proven beyond a reasonable doubt)).
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sider alone without violating Walton's Sixth Amendment freedoms. 251
The Walton Court thus affirmed both the constitutionality of the Ari-
zona capital punishment scheme and, implicitly, Summerlin's death
sentence.
252
Nevertheless, Summerlin filed his second amended petition for writ
of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona on November 22, 1995.253 Undeterred by Walton, Summerlin
again included his challenge to the constitutionality of Arizona's capi-
tal punishment scheme among his claims.254 The district court denied
relief, but it issued a certificate of probable cause enabling Summerlin
to appeal. 255
In the interim, the U.S. Supreme Court issued two key decisions
regarding the interplay between sentence enhancement and the Con-
stitution. In 1999, the Court decided Jones v. United States256 and re-
versed that defendant's sentence under the federal carjacking
statute. 257 That statute allowed sentencing judges to choose one of
three separate punishments, each of which depended solely on the
level of harm suffered by the victim.258 But the statute did not require
a jury determination on the facts of the victim's injury.259 The Jones
Court found this to be unacceptable:
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty
for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 260
One year after Jones, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New
Jersey.261 Apprendi involved a defendant convicted of second-degree
possession of a firearm.262 New Jersey law assigned a maximum pen-
251. Walton, 497 U.S. at 647.
252. Id.
253. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
254. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091. Summerlin raised the following five issues: (1) His
second court-appointed public defender engaged in a romantic encounter with his prosecutor,
resulting in a reversible conflict of interest; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at
the guilt phase of his capital trial; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty
phase of his capital trial; (4) the aggregate ineffectiveness of his legal representation prejudiced
his defense; and (5) his trial judge's heavy marijuana use deprived him of due process. Id.
255. Id. at 1091; see FED. R. App. P. 22(b)(1) (2003).
256. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
257. Id. at 252; see 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994).
258. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229, 251-52.
259. See id.
260. Id. at 243 n.6.
261. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
262. Id. at 469-70.
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alty of ten years imprisonment to the defendant's crime. 263 The sen-
tencing judge, however, found racism to be the motivation underlying
the crime and sentenced the defendant to twelve years under New
Jersey's hate crime enhancement. 264 The Supreme Court, relying on
Jones, invalidated the defendant's sentence because the penalty en-
hancement constituted "the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense" 265 to be "submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. '266
On October 12, 2001-one year after Apprendi-a three-judge
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
viewed the district court's decision to deny habeas relief to Summer-
lin.267  Relying on the newly announced Apprendi decision,
Summerlin reiterated his constitutional attack upon Arizona's death
penalty statute. 268 The panel upheld Arizona's system and noted that
although Apprendi contradicted much of Walton, it was bound to fol-
low Walton until the Supreme Court determined otherwise. 269 The
panel affirmed the district court's denial of relief in part but reversed
with respect to Summerlin's claim that his trial judge's heavy mari-
juana use deprived him of due process. 270 It remanded Summerlin's
cause for an evidentiary hearing on the matter.27'
On February 11, 2002, however, the panel withdrew its opinion. 272
It deferred submission of its decision pending the final disposition of
Ring v. Arizona.273 In Ring, the Court once again analyzed the consti-
tutionality of Arizona's capital sentencing scheme, this time with re-
spect to Timothy Ring's right to a trial by jury.274 Holding that its
decision in Apprendi compelled a contrary interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment, Ring expressly overruled its prior decision in Walton.2 75
It held that Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors-like the hate
crime aggravator in Apprendi-"operate as the functional equivalent
263. Id. at 470.
264. Id. at 471.
265. Id. at 494 n.19.
266. Id. at 490.
267. Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated by 281 F.3d 836 (9th Cir.
2002).
268. Id. at 930.
269. Id. at 956-57 (quoting Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 542 (9th Cir. 2001)) (stating that
"while Apprendi may raise some doubt about Walton, it is not our place to engage in anticipatory
overruling").
270. Id.
271. Id. at 957.
272. Summerlin v. Stewart, 281 F.3d 836, 837 (9th Cir. 2002).
273. Id. See generally State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139 (Ariz. 2001).
274. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
275. Id. at 589.
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of an element of a greater offense. ' 276 Thus, the Supreme Court in-
validated Arizona's death penalty statute, vacating Timothy Ring's
death sentence.277
The Ring decision prompted the Ninth Circuit to rehear Summer-
lin's case en banc to consider whether to apply Ring retroactively to
capital petitioners in collateral proceedings. 27 8 In Summerlin v. Stew-
art,2 79 the Ninth Circuit granted Summerlin's second petition for
habeas corpus and agreed to apply Ring retroactively. 280 It articulated
two alternative rationales for reaching its conclusion that Ring applied
retroactively to Summerlin. First, the Ninth Circuit found that the
Ring rule was substantive in nature and, thus, automatically retroac-
tive. 281 Alternatively, it found that, if the Ring rule was to be classi-
fied as procedural, it may still be applied retroactively because it: "(1)
seriously enhance[s] the accuracy of the proceeding and (2) alter[s]
276. Id. at 609 (citation omitted).
277. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing in dissent, supplied some foreshadowing:
The Court effectively declares five States' capital sentencing schemes unconstitutional.
There are 168 prisoners on death row in these States, each of whom is now likely to
challenge his or her death sentence. I believe many of these challenges will ultimately
be unsuccessful, either because the prisoners will be unable to satisfy the standards of
harmless error or plain error review, or because, having completed their direct appeals,
they will be barred from taking advantage of today's holding on federal collateral
review.
Id. at 620-21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
278. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit waited a
few months before voting to rehear Summerlin's case en banc. Id. Summerlin had petitioned
the Arizona Supreme Court to reopen his direct appeal to consider Ring's application to his
case, an extraordinary remedy available under Arizona law, and the Ninth Circuit wished to
assure that Summerlin exhausted all of his potential state remedies before proceeding to federal
court. Id. (citing Woods v. Kenna, 13 F.3d 1244, 1245-46 (8th Cir. 1994)). When the Arizona
Supreme Court denied Summerlin's motion, a majority of nonrecused, regular judges voted to
rehear the case en banc. Summerlin v. Stewart, 310 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2002).
279. 341 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003).
280. Id. More accurately, the Ninth Circuit held that Ring applied retroactively to habeas
petitioners who filed prior to the enactment of the AEDPA. See id. at 1096 n.4 (noting that
"[t]he question of whether a rule has retroactive application under AEDPA is a different inquiry
from the question of whether Teague precludes retroactive application of a rule"). Because War-
ren Summerlin's second petition was filed before the AEDPA's effective date, the Ninth Circuit
applied pre-AEDPA law. Id. at 1092 (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997)).
281. Id. at 1108. In holding that Ring announced a substantive rule, the Ninth Circuit majority
began by acknowledging that "the distinction between 'substantive' and 'procedural' is not al-
ways easy to divine." Id. at 1099 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). It
reasoned that Ring declared a substantive rule of law because it provoked the Arizona legisla-
ture into amending its death penalty statute. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1108. Because the Teague
standard-which bars retroactive application of new rules of criminal procedure-is inapplicable
to substantive rules, the majority held the Ring rule to be exempt from Teague analysis and
agreed to apply it retroactively to Summerlin's cause. Id.
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the understanding of bedrock procedural elements essential to the
fairness of the proceeding. '282
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
In Summerlin, the Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit
and refused to apply Ring retroactively to cases already final on direct
review.283 Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Summerlin
Court.284 He was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas. 285
In Summerlin, the Court held that Ring did not announce a substan-
tive rule. 286 To reach this conclusion, the Court articulated some dis-
tinctions between substantive rules and procedural rules.287 It defined
a substantive rule as one that "alters the range of conduct or the class
of persons that the law punishes. '288 Typically, it reasoned, substan-
tive decisions modify the elements of an offense, thereby altering the
range of conduct subject to sanction. 289 Procedural rules, on the other
hand, regulate who determines the defendant's culpability and how
that determination is made.2 90
The Court rejected Summerlin's contention that Ring modified the
elements of capital murder in Arizona. 291 It found that the State of
Arizona had delineated the facts necessary to support a death sen-
tence. 292 Ring merely held that a jury must find those facts. 293 Be-
282. Id. at 1109 (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)). The Ninth Circuit major-
ity found that even if the Ring rule was to be classified as procedural, it may still be applied
retroactively through the second Teague exception. Id. at 1121. It reasoned that Ring improved
the accuracy of capital determinations because "[olne of the critical functions of a jury in a
capital case is to 'maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal sys-
tem."' Id. (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.15 (1968)). By curing the struc-
tural defects in the sentences of Timothy Ring and others, the Ninth Circuit also explained that
Ring "alter[ed] the understanding of bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the
proceeding." Id. at 1109, 1116 (citation omitted).
283. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2521 (2004).
284. Id. Justice Scalia concurred in both Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). He also delivered the majority opinion in Blakely v. Wash-
ington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), which was announced on the same day as Summerlin. Blakely
sought to reconcile Apprendi with determinate sentencing schemes. Id.; see also United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005); United States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 26 (2004).
285. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2519.
286. Id. at 2523.
287. Id.
288. Id. (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1998)).
289. Id. at 2524.
290. Id. at 2523 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)).





cause "the range of conduct punished by death in Arizona was the
same before Ring as after," the Court held that Ring announced a
"prototypical" procedural rule. 294
The Court held that Ring did not fall within the Teague exception
for "watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamen-
tal fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. ' 295 It held that
Teague required Summerlin to establish that Walton seriously dimin-
ished the accuracy of his capital sentencing hearing such that "there
[was] an 'impermissibly large risk' of punishing conduct the law [did]
not reach. ' 296 The Court reasoned that Summerlin failed to meet this
burden for two key reasons. First, the Court cited several arguments
that suggest juries are no more accurate than judges: (1) juries' inabil-
ity to grasp legal standards; (2) juries' inability to overcome emotional
facts or personal bias; (3) juries' relative inexperience with factfinding;
(4) and the success of foreign judicial systems that rely upon judicial
factfinding.297 Second, the Court noted that Duncan v. Louisiana298
had not been retroactively applied during the Linkletter era.
299
Duncan held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury.300 The Summerlin Court reasoned
that "[i]f under DeStefano a trial held entirely without a jury was not
impermissibly inaccurate, it is hard to see how a trial in which a judge
finds only aggravating facts could be."' 30 1 It concluded that Ring was
Teague-barred.302
Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented.303 He was joined by Justices
John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
3°4
The dissent did not challenge the majority's conclusion that Ring an-
nounced a procedural rule. Rather, it focused its attack on the major-
ity's conclusion that Ring did not fall within the second Teague
294. Id.
295. Id. (citation omitted).
296. Id. at 2525 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312-13 (1989) (quoting Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
297. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2525 (citing Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1129-31 (9th
Cir. 2003) (Rawlinson, J., dissenting)).
298. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
299. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2525 (citing DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968)).
300. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 152.
301. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2526.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 2526-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer dissented in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555 (2000), and again in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2551 (2004).
In Ring v. Arizona, however, he concurred in the judgment because of his belief that the Eighth
Amendment requires jury sentencing in capital cases. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613-14
(2002).
304. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2526-31 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
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exception for accuracy-enhancing, "watershed" rules of criminal
procedure. 305
The dissent presented four arguments supporting its conclusion that
Ring is "central to an accurate determination that death is a legally
appropriate punishment. '306 First, Justice Breyer supplied his per-
sonal belief that "the Eighth Amendment demands the use of a jury in
capital sentencing because a death sentence must reflect a community-
based judgment that the sentence constitutes proper retribution. ' 30 7
He acknowledged, however, that his views had not carried the day in
Ring.308
Second, the dissent argued that juries are better equipped to make
the "community-based value judgments" that often accompany capital
sentencing.30 9 It cited as an example an Arizona aggravating factor,
arguing that "[w]ords like especially heinous, cruel, or depraved-par-
ticularly when asked in the context of a death sentence proceeding-
require reference to community-based standards, standards that incor-
porate values. ' 310 The dissent did not respond to the majority's con-
tention that Arizona "does not condition death eligibility on whether
the offense is heinous, cruel, or depraved as determined by community
standards.... It is easy to find enhanced accuracy in jury determina-
tion when one redefines the statute's substantive scope in such [a]
manner as to ensure that result. '311
Third, the dissent argued that retroactive application of Ring would
not compromise Teague's underlying values. 312 Specifically, it ad-
dressed the policies of finality, rehabilitation, and judicial economy.313
The dissent contended that the state's interest in finality and rehabili-
tation are "unusually weak where capital sentencing proceedings are
at issue. ' 314 After all, capital habeas proceedings often consume de-
305. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting); see supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
306. Sunmerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2527 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
313 (1989)).
307. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring)); Harris v.
Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515-26 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,
467-90 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) (holding that juries "express the conscience of the community
on the ultimate question of life or death").
308. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2528 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
309. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
310. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
311. Id. at 2526 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
312. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
313. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
314. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2530 (Breyer, J., dissenting). "A major reason that Justice
Harlan espoused limited retroactivity in collateral proceedings was the interest in making con-
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cades in spite of finality interests.31 5 Thus, the ordinary meaning of
"finality" is inapplicable to an unexecuted sentence of death, which, as
the dissent urged, is "an entirely future event. '316
As for rehabilitation, the dissent noted that "where the issue is life
or death, the concern that attention ultimately should be focused on
whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the commu-
nity is barely relevant. '317 And as for judicial economy, the dissent
noted that Ring would not "require inordinate expenditure of state
resources" because it affects only about "110 individuals on death
row."
3 18
Finally, the dissent argued that the Court's decision in DeStefano
does not necessarily foreclose retroactive application of Ring.319 It
distinguished DeStefano on two grounds.320 First, DeStefano analyzed
the retroactivity of Duncan under the Linkletter standard, not the
Teague doctrine.321 Second, retroactive application of Duncan "would
have thrown the prison doors open wide. '322 Ring, however, "in-
volve[d] only a small subclass of defendants deprived of jury trial
rights. ' 323 In fact, it is likely that Ring would be retroactively applica-
ble under the Linkletter standard.324 Therefore, the dissent concluded
that the majority's reliance on DeStefano was misplaced. 325 Summa-
rizing its major points, the dissent concluded:
[T]he majority does not deny that Ring's rule makes some contribu-
tion to greater accuracy. It simply is unable to say "confidently"
that the absence of Ring's rule creates an "' impermissibly large
risk" ' " that the death penalty was improperly imposed. For the rea-
sons stated, I believe that the risk is one that the law need not and
should not tolerate. Judged in light of Teague's basic purpose,
victions final, an interest that is wholly inapplicable to the capital sentencing context." Id.
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
315. Id. at 2529 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
316. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). In describing Justice Breyer's Summerlin dissent, Professor
Bickers noted that "whatever may be said of the importance of finality for decisions which con-
fine people for a period of time, the common understanding of finality would preclude the use of
that term about a death sentence while the sentenced prisoner remains alive." John M. Bickers,
Maybe Death Isn't So Different After All (July 18, 2004), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumbickersl.
php. Professor Bickers also reviewed Teague's application to new capital mitigation procedures
in Beard v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 2504 (2004), a case not considered by this Note.
317. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2530 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
318. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
319. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
320. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
321. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
322. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
323. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2531 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
324. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
325. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Ring's requirement that a jury, and not a judge, must apply the
death sentence aggravators announces a watershed rule of criminal
procedure that should be applied retroactively in habeas
proceedings. 32 6
IV. ANALYSIS
A great deal is missing from the Summerlin Court's analysis. The
Court began its analysis by whitewashing over the outlandishness of
the representation and process afforded to Warren Summerlin.
Where the Ninth Circuit devoted over 5,000 words to Summerlin's
story,327 the Supreme Court devoted only eighty-one. 328 In a single
paragraph, the Court recited the gruesome details of the victim's
death, the anonymous identification of the suspect, and Summerlin's
self-incrimination.329 Absent from the Court's opinion was any refer-
ence to Summerlin's mental and psychological deficiencies. 330 Also
missing was any mention of the inadequacy of Summerlin's revolving-
door representation, which included one attorney who became roman-
tically involved with the prosecutor and another who called only one
witness.331 The Court also omits the fact that "Summerlin's fate was
determined by a drug-impaired judge, habituated to treating penalty-
phase trials the same as non-capital sentencing, who relied upon inad-
missible evidence in making the factual findings that sentenced Sum-
merlin to death. '332
Most importantly, the Summerlin Court failed to frame the question
of Ring's retroactivity in the context of the Eighth Amendment. This
section discusses that failure. Specifically, it presents the following
three observations relating to the Eighth Amendment and its interre-
326. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
327. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1084-92 (9th Cir. 2003).
328. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2521.
329. Id. The Court, of course, failed to acknowledge the role of extrasensory perception in
Summerlin's arrest. See id. But see Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1084-85 (stating that "the police
received a tip from a female caller to an anonymous crime hotline service .... The caller later
was identified as Sunmerlin's mother-in-law who testified that the basis of her information was
her daughter's extra-sensory perception.").
330. See generally Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519. But see Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1084 (stating
that Summerlin "has organic brain dysfunction, was described by a psychiatrist as 'functionally
retarded,' and has explosive personality disorder with impaired impulse control"). The Eighth
Amendment forbids the execution of the mentally retarded. See generally Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002). There is no question that Atkins is retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989) ("if we held, as a substantive
matter, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons ...
such a rule would fall under the first exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity and would
be applicable to defendants on collateral review").
331. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1086-88.
332. Id. at 1115-16.
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lationship with Schriro v. Summerlin: (1) Summerlin ignores the
Eighth Amendment's direction that "a death sentence must reflect a
community-based judgment that the sentence constitutes proper retri-
bution; '333 (2) the retroactivity doctrine upheld by Summerlin cannot
be reconciled with an Eighth Amendment that draws its meaning
from evolving standards of decency; and (3) Summerlin highlights the
arbitrariness of a capital habeas system that is so dependent upon the
"fortuity of timing." 334
A. The Eighth Amendment Mandates Jury Sentencing
in Capital Cases
The Summerlin Court did not convincingly dispose of Justice
Breyer's argument that the Eighth Amendment mandates jury sen-
tencing in capital cases. In his concurrence to Ring, Justice Breyer
noted that retribution is the primary justification for capital punish-
ment.335 Jury sentencing, therefore, is required because the jury is in a
superior position to determine whether retribution is appropriate. 336
The Court acknowledges that "[c]entral to the application of the
[Eighth] Amendment is a determination of contemporary standards
regarding the infliction of punishment. ' 337 Jurors are better equipped
to make this determination because they
reflect more accurately the composition and experiences of the
community as a whole. Hence they are more likely to express the
conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or
death and better able to determine in the particular case the need
for retribution, namely, an expression of the community's belief that
certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity
that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death. 338
Jury sentencing is also necessary because the Constitution requires
that death penalty determinations bear "the hallmarks of the trial on
guilt or innocence. ' 339 Submitting questions of fact to a jury would
333. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2527 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584, 614 (2002)). Furthermore, the interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding that jeopar-
dizes an individual's life or liberty is uniquely compelling. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6(c), at 44 (1984).
334. Penry, 492 U.S. at 341 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
335. Ring, 536 U.S. at 614 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504,
515-26 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 467-90 (1984) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
336. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
337. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976).
338. Ring, 536 U.S. at 615-16 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976).
339. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1110 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bullington v. Mis-
souri, 451 U.S. 430, 439 (1981)).
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improve the accuracy of capital determinations in two ways.340 First,
it would add some much-needed formality to Arizona's penalty
phases. 341 As the Ninth Circuit noted, Arizona's pre-Ring penalty
phases were less formal than traditional capital punishment determi-
nations.342 Second, the submission of questions of fact to a jury would
avoid the problems caused by Judge Marquardt's unfortunate drug
problem. As the Ninth Circuit noted, Warren Summerlin's disastrous
trial "highlights the potential risk of accuracy loss when a capital deci-
sion is reposed in a single decision-maker who may be habituated to
the process. ' 343 The people of Tempe, Arizona never authorized War-
ren Summerlin's death sentence. 344 Devoid of "a community-based
judgement, ' '345 his death sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.
Therefore, the Summerlin Court's decision to withhold Ring from
Summerlin effectively constitutes an unwarranted imposition of the
death penalty.
B. The Teague Doctrine Cannot Be Reconciled with an Eighth
Amendment that Draws Its Meaning from Evolving
Standards of Decency
Summerlin perpetuates a retroactivity regime built on the tenets of
the legal positivists.346 Before Linkletter, the Court subscribed to the
Blackstonian view that judges never prescribe new law, even when
they overrule prior precedent. 347 Instead, they communicate "a prior
judicial failure to discover the law."'348 Thus, the early American
courts would have applied Ring to Warren Summerlin without hesita-
tion.349 Ring was "'not a new law but the application of what is, and
therefore had been, the true law." 350
Since Linkletter, however, the Court has embraced the Austinian
view that "judges do in fact do something more than discover law;
340. Id. at 1110-16.
341. See id. at 1110.
342. Id. (stating that "penalty-phase presentations to Arizona judges are capable of being
extremely truncated affairs with heavy reliance on presentence reports and sentencing memo-
randa, and with formal court proceedings frequently limited to a brief argument by counsel").
343. Id. at 1114. Of particular concern is when that "single decision-maker" is an elected
Arizona judge subject to various political pressures. Id. at 1115.
344. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2527 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
345. Id.
346. See supra notes 33-68 and accompanying text.
347. Blume & Pratt, supra note 37, at 326.
348. Id. (emphasis added).
349. See supra notes 69-113 and accompanying text.
350. Note, supra note 33, at 908 n.6 (emphasis added) (quoting Harry Shulman, Retroactive
Legislation, 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 355, 356 (1934)).
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they make it interstitially by filling in with judicial interpretation the
vague, indefinite, or generic statutory or common-law terms that
alone are but the empty crevices of the law."' 351 Justice Harlan be-
lieved in the duty of "a court of law, charged with applying the Consti-
tution to resolve every legal dispute within our jurisdiction on direct
review," to "apply the law as it is at the time, not as it once was.
352
His formulation rejects "the Blackstonian theory that the law should
be taken to have always been what it is said to mean at a later
time. ' 353 The Teague doctrine, therefore, is premised on a legal phi-
losophy that views Ring as nothing more than, as the Summerlin
Court phrases it, a judicial "change of heart. 354
The Eighth Amendment, on the other hand, is interpreted with a
more Blackstonian bent. Since Trop v. Dulles,355 the Court has re-
peatedly recognized that "the words of the [Eighth Amendment] are
not precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society. '356 These evolving standards of
decency are informed by "objective factors to the maximum possible
extent. ' 357 Objective factors include state legislation, sentencing deci-
sions of juries, and other indicia of community standards. 358 Judges,
therefore, do not decide what punishments are cruel and unusual;
rather, they merely discover what punishments are cruel and unusual.
The Teague doctrine is also premised on the assumption that our
justice system has reached its evolutionary peak. In Teague, the Court
explained that its exception for procedural rules is extremely narrow
because "it is unlikely that many such components of basic due pro-
cess have yet to emerge. '359 History tells us that this assertion is both
arrogant and incorrect. 360 As one commentator phrased it, "To as-
sume that government already has discovered every possible way to
351. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1965).
352. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1743 (1991) (citation omitted).
353. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 677 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
354. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2526 (2004) (stating that after "a criminal defen-
dant has had a full trial and one round of appeals in which the State faithfully applied the Consti-
tution as we understood it at the time, he may nevertheless continue to litigate his claims
indefinitely in hopes that we will one day have a change of heart").
355. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
356. Id. at 101; see, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399, 406 (1986); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976).
357. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
358. Id.
359. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312 (1989).
360. Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (1992).
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act arbitrarily, and that no new forms of due process violations can
occur seems amazingly optimistic. As new situations arise, so will new
due process violations. '361 Put differently, there will always be room
for improvement in the judicial process. 362
Summerlin illustrates Teague's incompatibility with an Eighth
Amendment that draws its meaning from contemporary standards of
decency. The Court held in Sawyer v. Smith 363 that
[tihe rule of Teague serves to "validate reasonable, good-faith inter-
pretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though
they are shown to be contrary to later decisions." Thus, we have
defined new rules as those that were not "dictated by precedent ex-
isting at the time the defendant's conviction became final." The
principle announced in Teague serves to ensure that gradual devel-
opments in the law over which reasonable jurists may disagree are
not later used to upset the finality of state convictions valid when
entered. This is but a recognition that the purpose of federal habeas
corpus is to ensure that state convictions comply with the federal
law in existence at the time the conviction became final, and not to
provide a mechanism for the continuing reexamination of final judg-
ments based upon later emerging legal doctrine.364
Thus, even in capital cases, the Teague doctrine favors comity and fi-
nality at the expense of accuracy, consistency, and "heightened relia-
bility." This is especially frustrating given Justice Breyer's observation
that the state's interest in finality and rehabilitation are "unusually
weak where capital sentencing proceedings are at issue. '365
C. The Teague Doctrine Cannot Be Reconciled with an Eighth
Amendment that Forbids Arbitrary and Capricious
Imposition of the Death Penalty
The Summerlin Court also fails to address the arguments of Judge
Stephen Reinhardt, who concurred in the Ninth Circuit decision
granting Warren Summerlin's petition for habeas relief.366 Judge
361. Id. (footnote omitted).
362. See id. Professor Rutherford bolsters her point by quoting Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 373 (1910), a cornerstone of Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause jurisprudence:
"Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a
principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave
it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions.... In the application of a constitution,
therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be."
Rutherford, supra note 360, at 30 (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 373).
363. 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
364. Id. at 234 (citations omitted) (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990), and
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301).
365. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2530 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
366. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
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Reinhardt noted that denying Summerlin the benefit of Ring would
violate the Constitution's proscription against arbitrary and capricious
punishments. 367 Emphasizing that the Constitution demands height-
ened reliability in capital cases, Judge Reinhardt argued that to exe-
cute Summerlin because his case came too early would be
unconstitutionally arbitrary. 368 Thus, even if traditional retroactivity
law compelled a different result in "run-of-the-mill" cases, those rules
cannot be applied in the capital context if it results in arbitrary treat-
ment of capital defendants. 369
Judge Reinhardt bases his contention on the fact that "death is dif-
ferent. ' 370 Since the beginning of modern death penalty jurispru-
dence, the Court has repeatedly held that the death penalty "is
different in both its severity and finality."'37' It has held that
"[b]ecause of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding dif-
ference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is
the appropriate punishment in a specific case."'372 When it comes to
retroactivity, however, the Court does not hesitate to apply Justice
Harlan's pre-Furman analysis to post-Furman capital cases.
373
Despite Justice Brennan's warning in Penry,37 4 the Court has con-
sistently rejected the argument that Teague should not apply in capital
cases.375 In so holding, the Court ignores the fact that the "foremost
concern" of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence "is that the
death sentence not be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious man-
ner. '376 Capital punishment must be reserved for the worst of the
worst, and similarly situated defendants must be treated similarly.377
367. See id. (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
368. Id. at 1122-23 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357
(1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
289 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
369. Id. at 1123 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
370. Id. (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 606 (2002); Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 289 (1972) (Brennan,
J., concurring)).
371. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977).
372. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
373. Justice Harlan delivered the Court's final major pre-Furman decision. See McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 185 (1971) (rejecting the argument that the absence of standards to
guide the jury's discretion on the punishment issue violates the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment).
374. See supra notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 203.
376. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 507 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
377. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-59
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Traditionally, the Court has carried out this command by requiring
the States to "narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death
penalty and.., ensure that the decision to impose the death penalty is
individualized. ' 378 It is for this reason that the Summerlin dissenters
so valued the use of juries in capital sentencing. But the risk of arbi-
trariness does not end once the verdict is announced. As Justice
Harlan reminded us in Desist, similarly situated defendants must be
treated similarly.379
Summerlin fails to carry out this command. In Judge Reinhardt's
words,
[E]xecuting people because their cases came too early-because
their appeals ended before the Supreme Court belatedly came to
the realization that it had made a grievous constitutional error in its
interpretation of death penalty law, that it had erred when it failed
to recognize that the United States Constitution prohibits judges,
rather than jurors, from making critical factual decisions regarding
life and death in capital cases-is surely arbitrariness that surpasses
all bounds. 380
Justice Harlan's distinction between direct appellants and capital
habeas petitioners is no longer compatible with an Eighth Amend-
ment that has changed dramatically since his retirement. 381 The Sum-
merlin Court failed to recognize this. Consequently, Warren
Summerlin is subject to an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.
V. IMPACT: PRELUDE TO A CAPITAL TEAGUE EXCEPTION
Schriro v. Summerlin could lead to a possible regime change regard-
ing questions of retroactivity in capital cases. Fifteen years of Teague
jurisprudence, however, have attached a stigma of futility to such ar-
guments. 382 In Summerlin, four Justices stopped short of renewing the
378. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 507 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
379. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
380. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1122 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
381. Compare Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1968) (noting that the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment Clause is "directed at the method or kind of punishment imposed"), with Roper
v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (holding that capital punishment of a defendant under the
age of 18 at the time that the crime was committed violates the Eighth Amendment).
382. During oral arguments, however, Justice Breyer was careful not to couch his argument as
one in favor of a general capital sentencing exception to Teague:
JUSTICE BREYER: [Hiere we will have the spectacle of a person going to his death
when he was tried in violation of a rule that the majority of the Court found to be a
serious procedural flaw. See, I'm not calling it absolutely overwhelming. So I'm giving
you that, but on the other side, I'm trying to focus your attention on the spectacle of the
man going to his death, having been sentenced in violation of that principle. What do
you want to say about that?
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argument for a capital exception to Teague.383 Justice Breyer's dis-
sent, however, illustrates that capital habeas petitioners can be ex-
empted from Teague without compromising any of the values that
Teague serves.
Part IV highlighted the arbitrariness of a capital habeas regime so
dependent on the "fortuity of timing. ' 384 This section proposes a lim-
ited capital exception to Teague that should provide a more meaning-
ful basis for distinguishing the successful capital habeas petitioner
from the unsuccessful capital habeas petitioner.385 It also demon-
strates that, in limited circumstances, capital habeas petitioners can be
exempted from retroactivity analysis without compromising the values
underlying Teague.
A. A Proposal Resurrected
Summerlin illustrates the Court's reluctance to adopt a general capi-
tal exception to Teague.386 Today's Court is hesitant to adopt such an
exception for the same reason that the Linkletter Court was hesitant
to retain declaratory theory. 387 A capital habeas petitioner could ex-
MR. TODD: Your Honor, in our view Teague answers that question, that if the Ap-
prendi/Ring rule would come within the Teague exception, then certainly in fairness, it
should be applied retroactively.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Justice Breyer is-is arguing for a-a general capital sentencing
exception to Teague. I mean, you-you could make that statement that he just made in
any capital case.
JUSTICE BREYER: No, but-but anyway ....
Tr. of Oral Argument, 2004 WL 937652, at *13-14 (2004). Summerlin's appellate counsel, Ken
Murray, was also hesitant to disturb Teague:
MR. MURRAY: I'd like to first go right to the heart of the issue of the questions that
were between Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia and point out that we are not, in fact,
asking for an exception in death penalty cases of Teague, but we are asking the Court to
look at the specific issues involved in capital cases and how the Teague exception that-
that implicates accuracy and fairness is applied in those contexts.
Id. at *23.
383. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2529 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
384. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 341 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
385. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (finding that
Georgia's capital punishment scheme violated the Eighth Amendment). In Furman, Justice
White argued that "capital punishment within the confines of [pre-Furman statutes] has for all
practical purposes run its course" because "the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency
even for the most atrocious crimes and [because] there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing
the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Id. (White, J.,
concurring).
386. See supra note 382 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 33-46 accompanying text. As Professor John M. Bickers noted:
In most cases, perhaps, the need for stability within the field of criminal law justifies the
ideological cost of the [Teague] dilemma. Perhaps it is simply too horrific to think of
retrying or releasing vast numbers of prisoners each time the Court announces a new
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ploit such an exception to "litigate his claims indefinitely" with every
new procedural rule. 388 Thus, if the Eighth Amendment is to play any
role in the Court's retroactivity analysis, it will have to be a limited
role.
The Eighth Amendment forbids the use of arbitrary distinctions
when separating those who deserve the death penalty from those who
do not.389 In the context of capital punishment, questions of retroac-
tivity should not hinge upon the date and time a petitioner's convic-
tion becomes final. Rather, retroactivity should hinge upon a more
meaningful distinction. Otherwise, we create a situation where, in the
words of Judge Reinhardt, "additional people [are] put to death fol-
lowing unconstitutional proceedings even though the Court has recog-
nized the unconstitutionality inherent in those future executions and
even though had the Court not erred initially, the death sentences in
question would previously have been set aside. '390
A limited capital exception modeled after the doctrine of procedu-
ral default would strike the proper balance between the Eighth
Amendment and Teague. In a 1998 article, Professor Tung Yin pro-
posed such a model as an alternative to Teague's retroactivity analy-
sis.391 Although his model seeks to supplant rather than modify
Teague, its application as a limited capital exception to Teague is more
relevant to the thesis of this Note. 392 Professor Yin's model articulates
a more principled approach to determining which litigants would re-
ceive the benefit of new procedural rules and which litigants would
not:
rule. Perhaps, too, the lack of a Teague bar would be counterproductive to the Consti-
tution: it might well be that the Court would avoid the retrial problem by simply re-
fraining from ever recognizing a procedural right which some states had previously not
allowed. Fear of opening the prison doors might tie the Court's hands even where they
saw what they believed to be a Constitutional wrong. In death cases, though, that price
seems unacceptably high.
Bickers, supra note 316.
388. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2526.
389. See supra notes 376-377 and accompanying text.
390. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1122 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
391. Yin, supra note 174, at 232. Professor Yin wrote his article during his clerkship with the
Honorable J. Clifford Wallace of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Id. at
203 n.*.
392. Id. at 232. This author does not suggest that Professor Yin's model does not warrant
broader application. It does. This author merely suggests that the Teague doctrine does not
offend as many constitutional directives when applied outside of the capital context. Abolition




[W]hether a habeas petitioner can claim the benefit of a Supreme
Court case decided after his conviction has become final depends on
whether the petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal.
If the petitioner did not raise the claim before, and is therefore
simply relying on a subsequently decided favorable case, then he
would not be able to obtain habeas relief. On the other hand, if the
petitioner did raise the claim on direct review, he would be able to
rely on a subsequently decided case that validates his claim.
393
Professor Yin's approach is modeled on the doctrine of procedural
default, which holds that the federal courts lack jurisdiction to review
the merits of a habeas petition if the relevant state court declined to
hear the claim because of the petitioner's failure to raise it pursuant to
reasonable state court procedures. 394 His model applies the "cause
and prejudice" standard enunciated in Wainwright v. Sykes, 395 arguing
that capital petitioners could not avail themselves of new procedural
rules absent a showing of good "cause" for the default and
"prejudice" should the federal court refuse to hear the matter. 396
Under Professor Yin's model, the novelty of a claim would not excuse
its default. 397
B. A Proposal Validated
The Summerlin Court's refusal to apply Ring retroactively to War-
ren Summerlin's pre-Walton conviction is arbitrary and unfair. War-
ren Summerlin asserted his Sixth Amendment rights at every stage of
the appellate process. 398 By the time the Court acknowledged the un-
constitutionality of Arizona's capital sentencing statute, however, Mr.
Summerlin's conviction had become final and his claim Teague-
barred.3 99
393. Id. (citations omitted).
394. Id.; see Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989). The doctrine of procedural default is a
corollary of the doctrine of independent and adequate state grounds, which dictates that federal
courts must abstain from reviewing state court decisions that are partially based on state law if a
decision on the federal question would not alter the result. Harris, 489 U.S. at 260-62. A habeas
petitioner's procedural default is considered independent and adequate state grounds. Id. at
262.
395. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
396. Yin, supra note 174, at 232-33.
397. Id. But see Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (finding adequate cause to exist "where a
constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel").
398. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that each of Summer-
lin's appellate attempts included an attack on the validity of Arizona's death penalty statute);
State v. Summerlin, 675 P.2d 686 (Ariz. 1983) (rejecting on direct appeal Summerlin's claim that
Arizona's death penalty statute was unconstitutional).
399. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091-92.
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Under Professor Yin's approach400 Ring would apply to Mr. Sum-
merlin's petition. Because the Arizona courts ruled on the merits of
Summerlin's Sixth Amendment challenge, it was not procedurally de-
faulted. Thus, Mr. Summerlin would be entitled to a decision on the
merits. Given Ring, it is clear that the Court would have granted the
writ under a procedural default approach. Mr. Summerlin would
therefore be entitled to a new sentencing proceeding before a jury of
his peers.
Such a result would not be inconsistent with the policies underlying
Teague. The Teague doctrine attempts to balance the same interests
that underlie the Great Writ itself: (1) "comity interests and respect
for State autonomy; ' 40 1 (2) finality interests and the State's interest in
rehabilitation;40 2 (3) protecting the innocent against erroneous convic-
tion;40 3 (4) assuring fundamentally fair procedures;40 4 and (5) judicial
economy.405 None of these policies would be unduly frustrated by
adopting Professor Yin's model or by applying Ring to Mr. Summer-
lin's petition.
First, Professor Yin's model promotes, rather than frustrates, princi-
ples of federalism. He argues that "Teague provides no incentive to
the state courts [or lower federal courts] to do anything but apply cur-
rent doctrine in a mindless mechanical fashion. ' '40 6 Recall that after
Apprendi but before Ring, a panel of the Ninth Circuit rejected Mr.
Summerlin's challenge to the Arizona capital sentencing statute, not-
ing that while Apprendi contradicted much of Walton, it was bound to
follow Walton until the Supreme Court determined otherwise.40 7 Pro-
fessor Yin's model is far less paternalistic. It inspires both state courts
and lower federal courts to develop their own interpretations of the
federal Constitution-a document all courts are sworn to uphold. 40 8
400. See Yin, supra note 174, at 297-305.
401. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2530 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308-10 (1989)).
402. Id. at 2529-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
690-91 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
403. Id. at 2528 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 312-13).
404. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
405. Id. at 2530 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
406. Yin, supra note 174, at 242.
407. Summerlin, 267 F.3d at 956 ("[W]hile Apprendi may raise some doubt about Walton, it is
not our place to engage in anticipatory overruling." (quoting Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523,
542 (9th Cir. 2001))).
408. Id. at 242-43.
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The procedural default model encourages state courts to "serve as a
laboratory" as they experiment with new constitutional safeguards. 40 9
Second, the State's interest in finality and rehabilitation are "unusu-
ally weak where capital sentencing proceedings are at issue. ' 410  As
Justice Breyer noted, "where the issue is life or death, the concern
that attention ultimately should be focused on whether the prisoner
can be restored to a useful place in the community is barely rele-
vant. '411 As for finality, the ordinary meaning of that term is inappli-
cable to an unexecuted sentence of death, which, as the Summerlin
dissenters observe, is "an entirely future event. ' 412 But whatever the
state's interest in upholding capital convictions, it would not be signifi-
cantly weakened by a capital exception to Teague. Capital habeas
proceedings often consume decades in spite of finality interests. 413
Furthermore, as Professor Yin notes,
Teague does not protect states from relitigation completely; it sim-
ply provides a fairly effective defense against such habeas petitions.
The states must still respond to habeas petitions based on newly
decided law. Moreover, because Teague applies only if the rule is
new, the states must argue this truly baffling issue. Thus, the real
difference in terms of finality between Teague and [the procedural
default approach] is that under the latter, there may be more suc-
cessful habeas petitions.414
Third, retroactive application of Ring is appropriate because War-
ren Summerlin is probably "innocent" of the death penalty.41 5 The
409. Id. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
410. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2530 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also id. (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 321 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring)). "A major reason that Justice
Harlan espoused limited retroactivity in collateral proceedings was the interest in making con-
victions final, an interest that is wholly inapplicable to the capital sentencing context." Id.
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 321 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
411. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
412. Id. at 2529 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In describing Justice Breyer's dissent in Summerlin,
Professor Bickers notes that "whatever may be said of the importance of finality for decisions
which confine people for a period of time, the common understanding of finality would preclude
the use of that term about a death sentence while the sentenced prisoner remains alive." Bick-
ers, supra note 316.
413. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2529 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
414. Yin, supra note 174, at 241-42.
415. An individual is "innocent" of the death penalty when it is likely that he or she would not
have been sentenced to death but for constitutional error. Deutscher v. Whitley, 946 F.2d 1443,
1445 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated by Hatcher v. Deutscher, 506 U.S. 935 (1992). Warren Summerlin
was probably innocent of the death penalty because his functional retardation made it likely that
he would not have been sentenced to death now that the Constitution forbids the execution of
the mentally retarded. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1084. See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.




Teague doctrine maintains that "[n]ew rules of procedure.., do not
produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the law does not make
criminal, but merely raise the possibility that someone convicted with
use of [the] invalidated procedure might have been acquitted other-
wise. ' 416 This principle ignores the Eighth Amendment, which "re-
quires a greater degree of accuracy .. . than would be true in a
noncapital case. ' 417 Had today's standards of capital sentencing and
ineffective assistance of capital counsel applied,418 a jury might have
heard about Warren Summerlin's organic brain dysfunction, his psy-
chiatric problems, and other powerful mitigating circumstances-facts
wholly ignored in Summerlin. In this sense, then, Professor Yin's
model strikes a superior balance between Eighth Amendment values
and the values underlying habeas jurisprudence.
Fourth, rules like Ring promote fairness in capital sentencing pro-
ceedings. The Teague doctrine, however, impedes fundamental fair-
ness instead of promoting it. In Summerlin, the Court conceded that
"[t]he right to a jury trial is fundamental to our system of criminal
procedure. ' 419 Yet it withheld retroactive application of Ring because
judicial factfinding did not "seriously diminish" accuracy in capital
sentencing-a result it could not have reached under either of Justice
Harlan's original formulations.420 Moreover, the Court's refusal to
apply Ring retroactively was particularly harsh given Mr. Summerlin's
repeated objections to judicial factfinding in his capital sentencing
proceeding. 42 1 A procedural default model of retroactivity would not
produce such a result.
Finally, a capital Teague exception would have little impact on judi-
cial economy. Professor Yin's model does not "require inordinate ex-
penditure of state resources, '422 because it limits relief to petitioners
who have not procedurally defaulted on their claims.423 Further, as
the Summerlin dissenters note, rules like Ring only affect about "110
individuals on death row. This number.., is small compared with the
approximately 1.2 million individuals presently confined in state pris-
ons. Consequently, the impact on resources is likely to be much less
416. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2523.
417. Id. at 2529 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993)).
418. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
419. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2526.
420. Id. at 2525 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312-13 (1989)).
421. See cases cited supra note 398.
422. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2530 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
423. Yin, supra note 174, at 288.
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than if a rule affecting the ordinary criminal process were made
retroactive.'"424
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision to bar retroactive application of Ring
undercut several values protected by the Eighth Amendment. First,
Summerlin ignores the Eighth Amendment's direction that "a death
sentence must reflect a community-based judgment that the sentence
constitutes proper retribution. ' 425  Second, the retroactivity regime
upheld by Summerlin cannot be reconciled with an Eighth Amend-
ment that draws its meaning from evolving standards of decency.
426
Finally, Summerlin highlights the arbitrariness of a capital habeas re-
gime so dependent upon the "fortuity of timing. '427
If Teague is to be squared with the Eighth Amendment, capital
habeas petitioners must be excused from its presumption against ret-
roactivity. The Summerlin dissenters illustrated that capital habeas
petitioners can be so exempted without compromising any of the val-
ues that Teague serves. And retroactivity formulations, like that of
Professor Yin, provide more meaningful bases for distinguishing the
successful capital habeas petitioner from the unsuccessful capital
habeas petitioner.428 Whatever the solution, it is clear that "retroac-
tivity must be rethought. '429 The Court has acknowledged that War-
ren Summerlin's death sentence violates the Sixth Amendment. 430 Its
decision to proceed with his execution violates the Eighth
Amendment. 431
Christopher M. Smith*
424. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2530 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
425. Id. at 2527 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002)).
426. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
427. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 341 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
428. See Yin, supra notes 391, 423 and accompanying text.
429. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
430. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (invalidating Arizona's death penalty
statute).
431. See supra notes 376-381.
* J.D., DePaul University College of Law, 2004; B.B.A., University of Iowa, 2001. I am par-
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